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This paper deals with the effects of labour market institutions on unemployment in a panel of 
19 OECD countries for the period 1960 to 2000. In contrast to many other studies, we use 
long time series and analyze cyclically adjusted trend values of the unemployment rate. Our 
novel contribution is the estimation of panel models where we allow for heterogeneous effects 
of institutions on unemployment. Our main results are that on the average a tighter 
employment  protection, a higher tax burden on labour income and a more generous 
unemployment insurance system increase, whereas a higher centralization of wage 
negotiations decreases unemployment. The strength of the effects differs considerably 
between countries. 
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1   Introduction 
 
Labour market institutions play a key role in explaining international differences in labour 
market performance, especially differences in the rate of unemployment. The most important 
labour market institutions considered in previous research are the unemployment benefit 
system and active labour market policy, the system of wage determination (wage bargaining 
centralization, union density, collective bargaining coverage), labour taxes including 
contributions to the social security system, and employment protection (see 
Nickell/Nunziata/Ochel 2005). 
There are a great number of studies which explore the implications of institutions for the 
unemployment rate (see Nickell 1997, Nickell/Layard 1999, Blanchard/Wolfers 2000, 
Bertola/Blau/Kahn 2001, Nickell 2003, IMF 2003, Belot/van Ours 2004, Bassanini/Duval 
2006, Griffith/Harrison/Macartney 2007; for a survey see Eichhorst/Feil/Braun 2008). 
Although the results are still somewhat mixed (OECD 2004), there seems to emerge a 
consensus that labour market institutions are one of the most important determinants of 
unemployment. For instance, Nickell (2003) reports that shifts in labour market institutions 
explain a great part of movements in unemployment across OECD countries. Employment 
protection, labour taxes and the unemployment benefit system increases unemployment and 
especially unemployment persistence. Admittedly, there exist some other studies, which find 
only weak evidence and attribute a much lower weight to labour market institutions (e.g., 
Baker/Glyn/Howell/Schmitt 2004, Bassanini/Duval 2006, Griffith/Harrison/Macartney 2007). 
However, as we will argue below, there are several shortcomings in these studies. Most of 
them are using only relatively short panels where the variations in institutions within the 
countries are relatively small and they neglect heterogeneity by assuming that the strength of 
the effect of institutions on unemployment is constant across the different countries.  
 
In this paper, we use a panel data set for 19 OECD countries from 1960 to 2000 for an 
empirical analysis of the effects of labour market institutions on unemployment. Our main 
contributions to the literature are the following topics. Firstly, we stress the importance of 
using long time series in order to get reasonable and reliable estimates of the effects of 
institutions. Secondly, we use panel data models which allow capturing heterogeneous effects 
between countries. Many scholars point out, that the effects of a particular labour market 
institution depend on other labour market regulations and institutional settings. In order to 
capture these effects, many studies introduce several interaction terms among institutions. The 
main problem with this approach is that there are many possible interaction terms, which may 
require the estimation of a huge number of parameters. We use an alternative approach. In our 
empirical model, we allow that the parameters can vary across countries. This specification 
can capture some unobserved heterogeneity. Thirdly, our dependent variable to be explained 
is the trend component of the unemployment rate. This allows us to avoid the inclusion of   3
arbitrary defined cyclical variables as interest rates or output gaps or the use of five- or ten-
year-averages (e.g. Blanchard/Wolfers 2000, Bertola/Blau/Kahn 2001) in order to purge the 
unemployment rate from business cycle effects. 
 
The paper is organised as follows. In section 2 we discuss the theoretical foundation of our 
empirical work, especially the role of institutions in explaining the medium- and long-run 
development of the unemployment rate. In section 3 we present the data. Section 4 contains 
the empirical results and section 5 summarises and draws some conclusions 
  
2   Some theoretical considerations 
2.1 The basic model 
 
In this paper, we concentrate on the explanation of the medium- and long-run development of 
unemployment in the OECD countries. As explained in detail below we purge the 
unemployment rate from all business cycle elements. The question we pose is the following: 
How far can we push the explanation of the international and time variation of the trend 
component of the unemployment rate by relying only on labour market institutions? 
 
The theoretical framework is based on the concept of the quasi-equilibrium rate of 
unemployment (QERU), developed by Layard, Nickel, Jackman (2005), Lindbeck (1993) and 
Phelps (1994), among others (for a short description of the basic model see IMF 1999). In the 
long run, the equilibrium in the labour market is determined by the intersection of the price-
setting curve and the wage-setting curve. 
 
The price-setting curve describes the pricing behaviour of firms with market power in 
imperfectly competitive goods markets. The output price is determined by a mark-up over 
marginal costs. It is assumed that marginal costs are increasing in employment. This implies 
in turn that the real producer wage rate is decreasing in employment. Labour market 
institutions affect the location of the price-setting schedule as they can have a direct effect on 
marginal costs. For instance, higher indirect taxes or higher employer contributions to the 
social security system increase marginal costs and the real wage compatible with the profit 
maximization condition is then lower for all levels of employment. Tighter employment 
protection legislation can also increase the marginal costs, as changes in the number of 
employees (hiring and firing) are more costly. 
 
The wage-setting curve describes as a reduced form the outcome of the wage bargaining 
process. The real wage rate depends positively on the level of employment and is affected by 
many institutional settings. The positive relationship between employment and the negotiated 
real wage rate can be explained by the fact that higher employment (lower unemployment) 
strengthens the bargaining power of insiders and/or trade unions or by efficiency wage 
considerations (no-shirking condition). A more stringent employment protection strengthens   4
the power of insiders who are represented by trade unions: At each level of employment, the 
negotiated wage rate will be higher (some qualifications to this statement will be discussed 
below). Higher contributions to the social security system by employees or higher taxes on 
labour income may induce trade unions to demand higher wages. The degree of coordination 
and centralization of wage negations can have complex effects on the negotiated wage rate.  
 
Since marginal costs as well as the wage determined in the negation process depend on 
employment, for a given set of institutional factors there exists an equilibrium value for which 
the wage setting and the price setting curves intersect. This equilibrium determines the real 
wage rate and the medium run unemployment rate. If institutions change, the power and the 
incentives of firms and/or unions are affected and the equilibrium rate of unemployment may 
change. Although theory does not offer unambiguous results, many empirical studies suggest 
that the net effects of a higher tax burden on labour income, of a more generous 
unemployment insurance system and of a higher degree of employment protection all lead to 
a higher equilibrium real wage rate and to a higher unemployment rate. With respect to the 
coordination/centralization indicator, the effect is not so clear. There may exist an inverted u-
shaped relationship. The power of labour unions has also no clear effect. 
 
2.2 The role of institutions 
 
In our empirical analysis we analyze the effects of the following institutions: Employment 
protection legislation, the generosity of the unemployment insurance system, the tax burden 
on labour income, the power of trade unions measured by union density and the degree of 




More stringent employment protection legislation may have several effects on the price and 
wage setting functions. Firstly, there exists a direct cost increasing effect on the side of firms. 
Secondly, as the employed insiders are to a certain degree protected against dismissals the 
trade unions may be induced to demand higher wages. Both channels lead to higher wage 
costs and to lower employment and a higher unemployment rate. Nevertheless, from a 
theoretical standpoint the effects of employment protection are not clear-cut. If the 
government requires firms to pay for stringent employment protection and if workers value 
such benefits by as much as they cost, then the supply and demand curves for labour will shift 
down equally, leaving employment unchanged if wages are flexible (Summers 1989). In case 
of a binding minimum wage for low skilled workers or of the resistance of powerful trade 
unions to wage cuts, real wages do not decline enough to prevent a negative employment 
effect of the costs of employment protection. These negative effects can possibly be mitigated 
if employment protection legislation positively affects the overall labour market performance 
by protecting workers against arbitrary dismissals and therefore creating a more stable and   5
trusty work relationship and making workers more willing to invest in firm specific human 
capital. 
 
Our measure for employment protection legislation (EPL) is taken from Allard (2005a). Her 
work is based on the OECD methodology and extended by reviewing the ILO’s International 
Encyclopedia for Labor Law and Industrial Relations. Like the OECD indicator, the Allard´s 
measure takes into account regulations concerning individual dismissals, collective dismissals 
and the temporary employment forms such as fixed-term employment and the supply of 
labour by temporary work agencies. Econometric studies using the OECD indicator have the 
problem of a paucity of observations - 21 countries and only two years (late 1980s and 1990s) 
until 2002 – that limit researchers to relate changes in employment protection regulation over 
a long time period to fluctuations in unemployment rates. The Allard indicator has yearly data 
from 1950 to 2003. This indicator shows sharp increases in regulation in the 1964-1978 
period and some deregulations afterwards (Allard 2005a). Figure 1 shows the development of 
the indicator for some selected OECD countries. The figure clearly reveals that a more 
stringent employment protection was enacted in many countries from the end of the sixties to 
the end of the seventies. This is confirmed by the evolution of the mean value. Since the 
beginning of the eighties only in few countries an economically significant change in 
employment protection took place.  
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Unemployment insurance system 
  
Unemployment benefits provide income to unemployed persons. This leads to an increase in 
the reservation wage and to a reduction of job search intensity. Search unemployment is 
higher. Further, when the unemployment insurance system is generous, trade unions may 
down weight the disutility of unemployment for their members and prefer higher real wages 
for the employed. Employment will be affected negatively. A row of microeconometric 
studies confirm the expectation that generous unemployment benefits increase the average 
unemployment duration (e.g. Katz/Meyer 1990, Hunt 1995, Lalive/van Ours/Zweimüller 
2006). 
 
For the generosity of the unemployment benefit system (NRW) we use the calculations of 
Allard (2005 b).  This indicator does not capture only the gross unemployment replacement 
rate but also other dimension of the generosity of the unemployment insurance system as the 
duration of entitlement, taxes on benefits and the conditions that must be met in order to 
receive the benefits (eligibility criteria). Her indicator enhanced the OECD´s gross 




Tax burden on labour income 
 
Taxes on labour income comprise income taxes, contributions to the social security system 
(both by employers and by employees) and consumption taxes (VAT). Taxation on labour 
income imposes a wedge between the real producer labour costs and the purchasing power of 
the net wage. Trade unions will demand a higher gross wage rate. Some authors (e.g., 
Blanchard, 2006) argue that consumption taxes have no effect on unemployment since they 
are a burden both on employed and unemployed persons and therefore have no effect on the 
reservation wage. Analogue to this argumentation Pissarides (1998) finds in different wage 
bargaining models that taxes on labour income hardly influence the unemployment rate if the 
replacement ratio is proportional to the after-tax earnings. However, this is not always the 
case and one can argue (Nickell 2006) that a certain degree of real wage rigidity will lead to 
higher labour costs when labour taxes go up. Garcia/Sala (2008) finds that for many countries 
(especially continental European countries) not only the level of total tax burden is relevant 
for unemployment but also the proportion paid by employees compared to the proportion paid 
by firms. 
 
Our measure of the tax burden is the tax wedge (TW) provided by W. Nickell (2006). This 
variable includes payroll taxes, social security contribution (both by employees and by 
                                            
1 Allard emphasizes, that a good indicator of the generosity of the unemployment benefits must incorporate these 
aspects, because the OECD countries differ widely in their taxation and eligibility conditions of unemployment 
benefits.   7
employers), income taxes on labour income and indirect taxes (VAT and other consumption 
taxes). TW is computed by W. Nickell (2006) using data from the OECD National Accounts 
and the OECD Revenue Statistics 
 
Coordination/centralization of wage bargaining 
 
In most OECD countries wages are set by a collective bargaining between employers and 
trade unions. Because unions increase wage pressure, their existence will raise unemployment 
(Nickell/Layard 1999). Unions also tend to reduce the dispersion of wages by raising the 
earnings of less-skilled workers relative to higher skilled workers. If this wage compression is 
strong enough, it eliminates employment opportunities for low-wage workers. The extent to 
which unions can succeed in raising wages or compressing wage differentials depends on the 
power of unions, which is determined, amongst others, by the rate of unionisation. In our 
empirical analysis we use union density (UDNET) as an indicator. UDNET is measured as the 
ratio of active union members and employed workers and is taken from Visser (2006). 
 
The result of wage negotiations between the unions and the employers may also depend on a 
high degree on the institutional settings of the bargaining process. When wage bargaining 
takes place at the firm level, both parties know that higher wage will lead to an increase in 
costs, to relative higher output prices of the firm and therefore to a loss of output and 
employment. This restrains the wage pressure. When the bargaining process is at the national 
level, the bargaining partners know that higher wages at the aggregate level will lead to a 
higher price level and therefore to a small increase in real wages. In addition, the induced 
inflation will probably encourage the central bank and/or the government to conduct a 
restrictive policy. Additionally, adverse macroeconomic shocks can be alleviated under highly 
coordinated bargaining, as centralized unions may be able to anticipate the macroeconomic 
effects of their wage bargains in ways that decentralized unions may not. For these reasons, 
the trade unions choose probably a cautious wage policy. The situation for negotiations on the 
industry level is somewhat different. Since all firms are affected in the same degree, the 
decrease in output and employment will be relatively small. Therefore, there is an incentive 
for trade unions to negotiate a higher wage rate. Since this is true for all industries, the 
aggregate wage rate and the equilibrium unemployment rate will be higher. The consequence 
is an inverted u-shaped relationship among the degree of centralization and unemployment 
(Calmfors/Driffill 1988). 
 
These results however rely on partly special theoretical assumptions. Cahuc/Zylberberg 
(2004) point out, that other, equally plausible, assumptions in the bargaining model lead to a 
decreasing monotonic relationship between the degree of centralization of bargaining and the 
unemployment rate. The evidence suggests that highly centralized bargaining will completely 
offset the adverse effects of unionism on employment (Nickell/Layard 1999).  
   8
As a measure of centralization we use the indicator CEW provided by W. Nickell (2006) who 
refers to the original work of Ochel. 
 
In many empirical studies (see, e.g., Bertola/Blau/Kahn, 2002; Blanchard/Wolfers, 2000; 
Nickel/Nunziata/Ochel, 2005) a measure of “coordination of wage bargaining” is used instead 
of the centralization of collective bargaining. Coordination results automatically from highly 
centralized wage bargaining, but can be also reached by institutions, such as employer or 
union federations, that can assist bargainers to act in concert even when bargaining itself 
occurs at the firm- or industry-level (Nickell 2006). In preliminary estimations, we have tried 
to include both the centralization measure CEW and the corresponding coordination measure 
(COW, see W. Nickel, 2006). In most of our models, COW was not significant and the signs 
of the estimated parameter were not robust. For this reason, we include only the centralization 
measure in the models presented in the next section. 
 
3   Empirical results 
3.1 Data 
 
In our empirical investigation we use a panel data set for 19 OECD countries for the period 
from 1960 to 2000 (the list of countries is shown in table 4). We will show that it is crucial for 
getting reasonable and reliable empirical results to use data that comprise observations that 
start in the sixties or at least in the early seventies. The main reason is that we only then 
observe enough variability in the settings of labour market institutions within the countries. 
 
The dependent variable is the standardized unemployment rate, provided by the OECD. For 
some countries, the standardized unemployment rate is available only for part of the sample 
period. In these cases, we extrapolated back the available series by using the unemployment 
rate defined by national agencies. To be specific, we calculated the ratio of the standardized 
and the non-standardized series in the first two years for which both series are available and 
extrapolated back the standardized series by multiplying the national series by the specified 
ratio. 
 
In order to get rid of the business cycle fluctuations we smooth the standardized 
unemployment rate using the Hodrick-Prescott (HP) filter. For the smoothing parameter λ  we 
tried values of 10 and 100. From a visual inspection, one can see that for  10 = λ  the filtered 
series still contains some business cycle fluctuations. All empirical results in this paper are 
generated by using  100 = λ  for filtering the unemployment series, but the results do not 
change substantially when we use  10 = λ . 
 
The use of the trend component of the unemployment rate has several advantages: We do not 
need to include in our model cyclical variables as the output gap, interest rates, exchange rates   9
etc. To eliminate cyclical effects, some authors use time averages (for instance over five- or 
ten-years periods). However, we can avoid this very arbitrary procedure. 
 
Figure 2 shows for example the observed series of the unemployment rate in the national 
definition UR_n), the standardized unemployment rate (UR) as well as the filtered series 
(UR_10 and UR_100) for Germany and UK. . 
 
Figure 2: National (UR_n) and standardized (UR) unemployment rate and smoothed 


















There exist other possibilities to measure the QERU component of the unemployment rate. 
They typically rely on the estimation of Phillips curve (e.g., Gordon, 1997, Laubach, 2001, 
Bode/Fitzenberger/Franz, 2008). The estimated quasi-equilibrium unemployment rate is in 
many cases (at least for Germany and the US) not much different from the HP-filtered series. 
 
The definition and the sources for the indicators of labour market institutions were discussed 
in section 2.2. A very informative survey on the definition and measurement of different   10
labour market institutions is given in Eichhorst/Braun/Feil (2008). A useful collection of 
many indictors constructed by different authors and institutions is provided by W. Nickel 
(2006). 
 
Table 1: Some descriptive statistics 
 
Table 1 shows some descriptive statistics for the data. For the discussion of our later empirical 
results the change in the within variability of the data is especially important. The within 
standard deviation measures the variability over time within the countries. A comparison 
between the sample 1960-2000 and 1975-2000 reveals that for some variables (especially for 
the employment protection index EPL) the within variability is much lower in the shorter 
panel. As the fixed effects estimator relies only on the within variation (and the random 
effects estimator at least partly) we could expect that empirical analyses with data beginning 
in midst seventies (or even later) deliver only imprecise estimates. This is one reason why we 
prefer long data series in analysing the relationships between unemployment and institutions. 
Variable Mean Std. Dev.Mean Std. Dev.Mean Std. Dev. 
Period
UR_10  overall 5.22  3.65 6.19 3.60 6.85 3.51
between 2.20 2.62 2.92
within 2.95 2.54 2.05
UR_100  overall 5.21  3.51 6.17 3.44 6.79 3.35
between 2.19 2.61 2.90
within 2.79 2.32 1.80
EPL  overall 1.67  1.10 1.95 1.05 2.07 1.02
between 0.87 0.96 0.99
within 0.71 0.46 0.32
UDNET  overall 42.32  18.34 42.89 19.36 42.63 20.17
between 17.87 19.09 19.98
within 7.02 5.87 5.60
NRW overall 9.78  8.61 11.81 8.66 12.86 8.60
between 5.71 6.72 7.06
within 6.57 5.67 5.16
CEW  overall 2.06  0.65 2.00 0.63 1.96 0.61
between 0.57 0.55 0.54
within 0.34 0.33 0.32
TW  overall 44.92  12.98 48.10 12.39 49.33 12.28
between 10.96 11.51 11.64
within 7.62 5.59 5.14
1960 until 2000 1970 until 2000 1975 until 2000  11
 
3.2 Estimation models 
 
Using panel data, we have to deal with potential unobserved heterogeneity between 
countries
2. In the presence of unobserved heterogeneity, even countries with the same values 
of all observed covariates (institutions) may have different values of the mean of the 
dependent variable (unemployment rate). There are some alternative approaches in order to 
model the influence of the unobserved country effects
3. We use five different empirical 
specifications that can be explained by using the following equation: 
k




=β + β + ∑             ( 1 )  
The index i denotes the country, the index t the year and the idiosyncratic error term is 
distributed as  2
i,t u u0 , ⎡⎤ σ ⎣⎦ ∼ . y is the trend component of the unemployment rate, x is a vector 
of k institutions, which are assumed to be strictly exogenous with respect to ui,t.. The 
unobserved heterogeneity can be reflected in principle in different intercepts  i,0 β  and/or slope 
coefficients  i,j β  between the countries. 
 
Model 1) Random effects (RE): The random effects model is the most restrictive model that 
accounts for unobserved heterogeneity. The slope coefficients are identical for all countries. 
The unobserved heterogeneity influences only the stochastic intercepts that are specified as 
the sum of a general constant  0 β  and a random variable i,0 ε  which must not be correlated with 
the regressors in the model. Therefore we have i,j j, j 1,...,k β =β =  and  i,0 0 i,0 β =β +ε , where 
the random effect is distributed as 
0
2
i,0 i |x 0 , ε ⎡ ⎤ εσ ⎣ ⎦ ∼ . In case the assumption is violated, 
( i,0 ε is correlated with the observed regressors), the estimator for the slope coefficients is not 
consistent. 
 
Model 2) Fixed effects (FE): The only but important difference to model 1 is that it is now 
allowed for the individual effects to be correlated with the observed covariates. In this case, 
i,0 β  is estimated as a fixed parameter. 
 
Model 3) Random coefficients (RC): Additionally to the intercepts as in model 1 the slopes 
can vary across the countries:  i,j j i,j β= β + ε, where  2
i,j ,j 0, , j 0,...,k ε ⎡⎤ εσ = ⎣⎦ ∼ . We refer to  i,j ε  
as the country effects. 
 
                                            
2 We call the heterogeneity not individual effects, but country effects in our article. 
3 For a detailed discussion of the models see, e.g., Cameron/ Trivedi (2005) or Hsiao(2003)   12
The random variables  i,j ε  are uncorrelated between countries and not correlated with  i,t u  and 
the observed regressors.. The first version of model 3 (RC_ind) allows for distinct variances 
of the country effects but assumes that  i,j ε  and  i,s ε  are uncorrelated for js ≠ . In the second 
version of model 3 (RC_cor) the country effects for different indicators may be correlated 
within a country.  
 
Model 4) Mixed model (MX): The intercepts are modelled as fixed effects, the slope 
parameters as random coefficients in the same way as in model 3.
4 The first version (MX_ind) 
assumes again that the  's ε for different explaining variables are uncorrelated whereas the 
second version (MX_cor) allows for correlated country effects. 
 
To the best of our knowledge, in the empirical literature concerning the institution-
unemployment nexus we find mostly models 1 and 2. These models allow only additive 
effects of unobserved heterogeneity and assume that the strength of the effect of institutions 
on unemployment is constant across countries. This may be a severe shortcoming. In this 
paper, we allow additionally heterogeneous effects of institutions on unemployment. 
 
3.3 Empirical results 
 
Table 2 shows the estimation results fort the fixed effects and the random effects model for 
the period 1960 to 2000 (FE_60 and RE_60, respectively). The estimated parameters and their 
standard errors are almost identical in both specifications. The 
2 χ -statistic of the Hausman 
test with 5 degrees of freedom is 9.13 with a p-value of 0.104. This implies that we could not 
reject the hypothesis that the observed regressors are uncorrelated with the residual. On the 
other hand, the Akaike information criterion (AIC) favours the FE specification. All following 
discussions are based on the fixed effects model. Four institutions have a highly significant 
effect on the unemployment rate: Tighter employment protection (EPL), a higher replacement 
rate (NRW) and a higher tax wedge (TW) all increase unemployment, whereas a higher 
degree of centralization in the wage bargaining process (CEW) leads to a lower 
unemployment rate. The parameter for union density (UDNET) is positive but not 
significantly different from zero. In order to receive an impression of the economic relevance 
of the results we translate the estimated coefficients into the implied changes of the trend 
unemployment rate when we compare the minimum and the maximum observed values of the 
institutions. For the employment protection indicator we get an increase of 4.7 percentage 
points, for the replacement rate an increase of 3.1 percentage points, for the tax wedge an 
increase of 7.6 percentage points, for union density an increase of 0.3 percentage points and 
                                            
4 In the literature the name mixed models is often used for more elaborate random effects models as for example 
random coefficients models or multilevel linear models (Cameron/Trivedi 2005). Here we deviate from the 
literature and use for model 4 this name to express that this specification permits random as well as fixed effects.   13
for the centralization indicator a decrease of 3.1 percentage points. With the exception of 
union density, the effects are relatively high but nevertheless in a plausible range. 
 
Table 2: Panel estimations for Unemployment I 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 FE  RE
+ FE_70  FE_75  FE_cluster 
EPL  1.147*** 1.153*** 0.999***  0.084  1.147*** 
  (0.124) (0.122) (0.152) (0.184) (0.397) 
UDNET  0.004 0.002 -0.002 0.006 0.004 
  (0.008) (0.008) (0.011) (0.011) (0.025) 
NRW  0.074*** 0.075*** 0.047*** 0.035*** 0.074*** 
  (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.022) 
CEW  -1.531*** -1.555*** -1.867*** -1.679***  -1.531* 
  (0.202) (0.199) (0.218) (0.219) (0.746) 
TW  0.114*** 0.111*** 0.169*** 0.172***  0.114** 
  (0.012) (0.012) (0.013) (0.012) (0.041) 
cons  0.172 0.791 -0.902 0.498 0.172 
  (0.690) (1.001) (0.963) (1.069) (2.688) 
N  671 671 531 446 671 
AIC  2402.49 2523.18 1808.26 1392.53 2400.49 
r2_o  0.178  0.079  0.025  0.178 
r2_w  0.620  0.552  0.465  0.620 
r2_b  0.029  0.008  0.000  0.029 
F-Value  113***  124***  146***  
FE and RE: 1960 until 2000; FE_70: 1970 until 2000; FE_75: 1975 until 2000; FE_cluster: Estimation with 
cluster-robust standard errors, 1960 until 2000. 
+We use the maximum likelihood random-effects estimator 
Standard errors in parentheses, * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
r2_o: R
2 overall; r2_w: R
2 within; r2_B: R
2 between. 
F-Value: F-test for H0: No fixed effects 
 
Next, we discuss the effect of different estimation periods for the results. Columns 3 and 4 in 
table 2 show the results for the fixed effects model for the period 1970 to 2000 (FE_70) and 
for the period 1975 to 2000 (FE_75), respectively.
5 Compared with the results in column 1 
(Fixed effects model for period 1960-2000), the results for the estimation period 1970 to 2000 
show no dramatic changes. When we use the shortest panel (1975-2000), the parameter of 
employment protection is much lower and not significant. This can be explained with the 
already mentioned much lower within variability of the explaining variables, especially of the 
employment protection indicator. 
 
A potential problem is that the reported standard errors require the errors to be i.i.d within a 
country. It is well known that inclusion of fixed or random individual-specific effects reduces 
the correlation in errors, but it may not be eliminated in panel data. Therefore, column 5 
(FE_cluster) shows the fixed effects estimation with cluster-robust standard errors for the long 
                                            
5 We show here only the fixed effects estimates, because there are no relevant differences, like with the longer 
panel, between random effect and fixed effect estimation.    14
panel 1960 to 2000.
6 In many cases, the standard errors increase considerably, but the 
parameters of EPL, TW and NRW remain significant. 
 
An alternative approach is to use a richer model for the unobserved country effects. The fixed 
and the random effects model allow only for heterogeneity in the intercept term but assume 
that the effects of the explaining variables have the same magnitude in all countries. There are 
many arguments why this may not be a correct assumption. For instance, the effect of the 
replacement rate may depend in an unmeasured way on the structure of the tax system or 
other institutions. One possibility to take into account such heterogeneity is to include 
interaction effects (see, e.g., Belot/van Ours, 2001). We choose an alternative and allow the 
parameters to vary across the countries. 
 
As already explained in section 3.2, all parameters are now specified as  i,j j i,j β =β +ε . Table 3 
shows for the estimation period 1960 to 2000 the mean values of the estimated parameters. 
We present the two versions of the random coefficients model (RC_ind and RC_cor) and the 
mixed model (MX_ind and MX_cor). The first version in each class of models assumes no 
correlation between the country effects for the indicators; in the second version, the country 
effects of the different institutions may be correlated within a country. There are no big 
differences between the models, the AIC favours marginally MX_ind. In all estimations, the 
reported standard errors are now very similar to those from the fixed effects model with 
cluster robust standard errors (see Table 2). For some institutions (EPL and TW) the estimated 
parameters are somewhat lower, for other institutions (NRW and CEW) they are (in an 
absolute sense) somewhat higher. The general economic interpretation does not change. 
 
Table 3: Estimations of Models with Parameter Heterogeneity for Unemployment 
  (1) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
 FE  RC_ind  RC_cor  MX_ind  MX_cor 
EPL  1.147***  0.744** 0.843** 0.745** 0.742** 
  (0.124) (0.347) (0.343) (0.349) (0.344) 
UDNET  0.004 0.037 0.046 0.044 0.044 
  (0.008) (0.052) (0.053) (0.055) (0.055) 
NRW  0.074***  0.102*** 0.111** 0.101*** 0.103** 
  (0.012) (0.036) (0.050) (0.039) (0.047) 
CEW  -1.531*** -2.154**  -1.517  -2.533** -2.806*** 
  (0.202) (0.919) (1.025) (1.057) (1.029) 
TW  0.114***  0.077** 0.068** 0.071** 0.075** 
  (0.012) (0.030) (0.031) (0.032) (0.033) 
N  671 671 671 671 671 
AIC  2402 1936 1919 1829 1845 
Standard errors in parentheses, * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
All models of table 3 are estimated for the period 1960 to 2000 
We use the maximum likelihood estimator for the models (6) – (9). 
                                            
6 Again, we present only the fixed effects estimates, because there are no relevant differences between random 
effect and fixed effect estimation with cluster robust standard errors.   15
In table 4 we present the estimated parameters for each country in our sample. The estimated 
coefficients for the employment protection indicator (EPL) are positive for 16 out of 19 
countries. The exceptions are Japan, Sweden and the United States. The results for the labour 
union density (UDNET) are somewhat mixed as only 11 of 19 countries show a positive 
coefficient. This is not surprising, as the mean value of this parameter is highly insignificant. 
The coefficient for the replacement rate (NRW) is positive for 17 countries. The coefficient 
for the centralization indicator (CEW) is negative for 13 countries. The coefficient for the tax 
wedge (TW) is positive for 16 countries. These results imply that the estimated mean values 
of the parameters (Table 3) are not dominated by extreme values of single countries. With 
only small qualification we can conclude that the mean values represent a consistent picture 
across most countries in the sample concerning the effects of labour market institutions on the 
medium term development of the unemployment rate. 
 
On the other hand, the results show also that there is a remarkable heterogeneity between the 
countries. This may have partly technical reasons (low within variability of indicators in 
individual countries or measurement errors). However, there may also exist special 
institutional settings that change the usual effect of a single labour market institution. For 
example, in the literature the institutional setting of Denmark is described as the flexicurity 
model, which is characterized by its unique combination of flexibility (measured by a low 
level of employment protection), social security (a generous system of social welfare and 
unemployment benefits) and active labour market programmes (Zhou 2007). An important 
role may also play the interrelationships between labour and product market regulations 
(Koeniger/Prat 2007). Or another example: The indicator for the generosity of the 
unemployment insurance system (NRW) is very low in Italy and in the United States. The 
effects on unemployment may be very different in the two countries. Compared to the US, in 
Italy the support of unemployed individuals by the family and insurance systems organized by 
trade unions is much higher. This may imply that the low “official” replacement rate in Italy 
has no wage dampening effect. 
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Table 4: Country Specific Parameters for MX_ind Estimation   
Country EPL  UDNET NRW CEW TW 
Australia 1.034  0.079 0.181 -2.666 0.229 
Austria 0.184  -0.097 0.006 -2.533 -0.011 
Belgium 1.261  0.155 0.113 -2.533 0.077 
Canada 2.669  0.360 0.105 -2.533 -0.097 
Denmark 0.760  0.132 0.044 -1.742 -0.115 
Finland 0.768  0.092 0.016 -8.676 0.212 
France 1.849  -0.173 0.145 -2.533 0.067 
Germany 2.176  -0.603 0.020 -2.533 0.171 
Ireland 1.996  0.014 0.277 -1.939 0.071 
Italy 1.827  0.013 -0.212 1.867 0.249 
Japan -0.419  -0.153 0.088 -2.533 -0.009 
Netherlands 0.847  0.280 0.083 -6.632 0.032 
Norway 0.175  0.405 0.231 1.373 0.142 
Portugal 0.154  0.075 0.050 -0.575 0.045 
Spain 1.915  0.070 0.225 -2.696 0.064 
Sweden -1.318  0.184 -0.022 -1.093 0.076 
Switzerland 0.222  -0.011 0.060 -2.212 0.032 
United Kingdom  0.268  0.088 0.087 -5.405 -0.014 
United States  -2.220  -0.078 0.419 -2.533 0.121 
 
 
In order to check the stability and robustness of the results we estimated the model MX_ind 
for samples where we excluded in each case one country. Blanchard and Wolfers (2000) are 
doing the same robustness check in their seminal paper.The results are presented in table 5. 
The country shown in column 1 denotes the country that is excluded. The estimated mean 
vales of the parameters differ in a qualitative sense not very much between the samples. The 
stability of the parameters confirms our conclusion that the results does not depend crucially 
on the inclusion or exclusion of single countries. 
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Table 5: Stability of the parameters 
Country excluded  EPL  UDNET  NRW  CEW  TW 
Australia 0.733
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As a last exercise, we calculate the model implied unemployment rates and compare them 
with the actually observed values. As figure 3 shows, for many countries there seems to exist 
a good fit. Nice examples are Austria, Belgium, Denmark, ‘France, Netherlands or United 
Kingdom. 
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For some countries, the fit is not totally satisfactory. Especially, in Germany the model 
implies a very strong jump of the unemployment rate in the early seventies and an erratic 
behaviour in the early nineties. A QQ-plot, as a test of normality of the residuals, shows 
significant deviations for Germany in the years 1972 to 1974 and in the years 1991 and 1992. 
In all other countries, there is no significant departure from normality. The problem in 
Germany for the years 1991/92 may be due to some data problem in the first years after the 
German reunification. The sharp increase of the predicted unemployment rate in the early 
seventies is generated in large part by the dramatic increase in the indicator of employment 
protection as measured by Allard (see Figure 1). Within three years, the indicator jumps from 
a value of about 1.1 to 2.9. This may be an overstatement of the actual development. 
However, we like to stress that the increasing trend of the unemployment rate in Germany can 
be explained by a model relying solely on institutional settings. 
 
4   Summary and conclusions 
 
Using different empirical models, we analyzed the effects of important labour market 
institutions on the trend component of the unemployment rate in 19 OECD countries for the 
period from 1960 to 2000. Our main results are: A tighter employment protection legislation, 
a more generous unemployment insurance system and a higher tax burden of labour income 
increase the medium term development of the unemployment rate, whereas a higher 
centralization of the wage bargaining process lowers unemployment. Union density has no 
clear effect and seems to be unimportant. The stability of these results across different 
statistical models and different samples clearly indicates that labour market institutions are 
important determinants of the unemployment rate. Figure 3 shows that the model is able to 
reproduce the main characteristics of the development of the unemployment rate in most 
countries. It can explain both the cross-section variation between countries and the time series 
development within a country. A crucial prerequisite for finding clear and significant effects 
of institutions on unemployment is the use of samples with sufficient variability of the 
explaining variables over time within countries. In many countries, major changes in 
institutional settings took place in the late sixties and early seventies in the previous century. 
In order to get reliable results it is essential to include these years in the sample. 
 
An important result of our study is the remarkable heterogeneity between countries. The 
estimated parameters scatter about the common mean. The strength of the effect of a labour 
market institution may depend on a large number of unmeasured economic and cultural 
factors and on complicated interactions between imperfectly measured institutional settings. 
That means that not in each country a change of an institution may have a noticeably impact 
on unemployment. Nevertheless, a fair summary of our empirical results is the conclusion that 
on the average and in most cases also for an individual country institutional settings are an 
important determinant of the medium term development of the unemployment rate. 
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The unemployment rate is only one among a greater list of indicators of labour market 
performance. In a study for 60 countries, Caballero et al. (2004) find that job security 
regulation reduces the speed of adjustment of employment to shocks and lowers the growth 
rate of total factor productivity. The results in Gomez-Salvador, Messina and Vallanti (2004) 
show that the strictness of employment protection, the extent of wage bargaining co-
ordination and the generosity of unemployment benefits have a negative effect on job creation 
and the pace of job reallocation. Messina (2005) finds that more unionized and coordinated 
wage-setting structures as well as employment protection imply a lower employment share in 
the service industry that is the most expanding sector in modern economies. Bartelsman et al. 
(2010) show in a calibrated model that high-risk innovative sectors are relatively smaller in 
countries with strict employment protection legislation. This may reduce the growth rate of 
total factor productivity. Flaig/Rottmann (2009) find that a stricter employment protection and 
a higher tax wedge reduce the labour intensity of production. Lommerlund/Straume (2010) 
show that more employment protection decreases firms incentives for the adoption of new 
technologies. This (not complete) list of results of research complements the conclusion of 
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